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This Article intends to reconcile two competing paradigms within
the law and economics model of corporate governance. The first par-
adigm, which has its intellectual origins in the work of Ronald Coase,'
holds that the modern, publicly held corporation is a nexus of con-
tracts among the company's various contributors. The term "nexus of
contracts" has become a revolutionary banner that has "transformed
not only our understanding of the law, but the law itself."2
The nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law offers a simple
lesson: one should not view corporations as particularized forms of
trusts or as fictitious creatures of state law. Rather, according to the
law and economics perspective that the nexus-of-contracts approach
to corporate law exemplifies, one should view the corporation as a
"complex set of explicit and implicit contracts," and corporate law as
enabling "the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the
many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a
large economy."3 In other words, one should view the corporation as
nothing more than a set of contractual arrangements among the vari-
ous claimants to the products and earnings generated by the business.
The group of claimants includes not only shareholders, but also credi-
tors, employee managers, the local communities in which the firm op-
erates, suppliers, and, of course, customers.
t J. DuPratt White Professor of Law and Director, John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Cornell Law School. This essay is dedicated to Professor Mel Eisenberg of the
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interchanges with Mel during the law and economics break-out session of the Association
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I See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOCNcA 386 (1937).
2 Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fische 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1449, 1449 (1989).
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The core insight of this nexus-of-contracts paradigm is that con-
tract defines each participant's rights, benefits, duties, and obligations
in the corporate endeavor. This insight, in turn, implies that one
should not give any class of claimants preference over any other. In-
stead, each claimant or a group of claimants deserves to receive only
the exact benefits of the particular bargain that it has struck with the
firm, no more and no less. What claimants have bargained for, how-
ever, may differ enormously from firm to firm, depending on a com-
plex set of exigencies.4
The nexus-of-contracts approach to the corporation appears to
be strongly at odds with the second paradigm of corporate govern-
ance. The second paradigm represents both the standard law and ec-
onomics view and the view reflected in traditional state and corporate
law rules; it posits that corporations and their directors "owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone."5 Commentators
advance a variety of arguments to support this second paradigm. For
example, some argue that needless complexity would result if corpora-
tions were required to serve the interests of groups other than share-
holders. Specifically, corporate practitioners often argue that if
directors must serve constituencies other than shareholders,
[t] he confusion of... trying to ... require directors to balance the
interests of various constituencies without according primacy to
shareholder interests[] would be profoundly troubling. Even
under existing law, particularly where directors must act quickly, it
is often difficult for directors acting in good faith to divine what is
in the best interests of shareholders and the corporation. If direc-
tors are required to consider other interests as well, the decision-
making process will become a balancing act or search for compro-
mise. When directors must not only decide what their duty of loy-
alty mandates, but also to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in
what proportions), poorer decisions can be expected.6
Scholars who approach this issue from a law and economics per-
spective reach the same result as the corporate bar. Those scholars
argue that corporations should maximize value for shareholders and
shareholders alone because shareholders, as residual claimants, have
4 For example, investors in riskier firms should expect higher rates of return on their
investments to compensate them for this additional risk. Workers with highly specialized
skills or whom labor unions represent may be able to command higher levels of compensa-
tion than other workers. Similarly, suppliers or customers with better bargaining power,
better negotiating skills, or better lawyers may be able to obtain better rates of return than
similarly situated claimants in other firms.
5 Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Share-
holders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. Rxv. 23, 23
(1991).
6 ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion,
45 Bus. L w. 2253, 2269 (1990).
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the greatest incentive to maximize the value of the firm. As Easter-
brook and Fischel observed:
As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the
appropriate incentives ... to make discretionary decisions. The
firm should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and
costs are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the
shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed
claims on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in
increased security) from the undertaking of a new project. The
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of
the marginal costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exer-
cise discretion.7
Thus, one seemingly cannot reconcile the two paradigms. The
nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law posits that one can de-
compose the corporation into a complex set of contractual relation-
ships. Consequently, under this approach, everything is up for grabs
or, at least, subject to negotiation. Constituencies such as workers,
bondholders or other creditors, customers, suppliers, and managers
ought to be able to contract for the right to be the exclusive (or, at the
very least, the partial) beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties. Af-
ter all, if a corporation is simply a complex web of contracts, the vari-
ous participants to the corporate venture should be able to contract
among themselves to obligate the directors to serve broad societal in-
terests, the interests of the firm's workers, or the interests of any other
nonshareholder constituency.
By contrast, everything is not up for grabs with respect to fiduci-
ary duties. There is a single one-size-fits-all solution; the parties
should write the corporate contract such that the shareholders always
win. The notion that shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of a
corporation's fiduciary duties is fundamentally at odds with the idea
that a corporation is merely a nexus of contracts, with no set of claim-
ants having any a priori rights in relation to any other.
This Article seeks to reconcile these two competing corporate law
paradigms. My thesis is quite radical. Simply put, fiduciary duties are
not all that they appear to be. They can be (and frequently are) modi-
fied by contract. Thus, contrary to popular wisdom, the notion that
shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties is the
default rule rather than the mandatory rule. One can reconcile the
tension between the shareholder-primacy paradigm and the nexus-of-
contracts paradigm if one recognizes that the shareholders can con-
sent to waive the shareholder-primacy paradigm. Because sharehold-
7 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26J.L. & EcoN.
395, 403 (1983).
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ers are at the top of the contract heap, the nexus-of-contracts
paradigm subsumes the shareholder-primacy paradigm.
I also will argue that this issue has generated confusion because
nonshareholders rarely find it in their interest to contract with share-
holders to vary the shareholder-primacy default rule. However, in cer-
tain contexts, such as bankruptcy, circumstances change, and the
interests of shareholders are subordinated to the interests of other
constituencies.
Part I provides a fuller description of the nexus-of-contracts para-
digm in corporate law. Part II provides an economic analysis of corpo-
rate fiduciary duties to shareholders and juxtaposes these insights with
the nexus-of-contracts approach presented in Part I. Part III presents
the Article's basic thesis: the nexus-of-contracts paradigm subsumes
the shareholder-primacy paradigm, and provides examples of this the-
ory in action. In Part Ill, I also provide my perspective on the implica-
tions of this analysis for the broad issue of corporate social
responsibility. A brief conclusion follows.
I
TBE NExus-oF-CoNTRACTs APPROACH
The nexus-of-contracts approach to the modem, publicly held
corporation produces three important and related insights about cor-
porate law. The first is that shareholders' rights and duties are (or
should be) defined by contract. The second is that corporate law
should be "enabling" rather than mandatory. The third is that no par-
ticular set of outcomes is best for all firms. Rather, each firm must
find the specific set of contractual obligations that best suits its
shareholders.
As Oliver Hart observed, each type of business organization, in-
cluding the corporation, "represents nothing more than a particular
'standard form' contract."8 Indeed, the very justification for having
different types of business organizations is to permit investors, entre-
preneurs, and other participants in the corporate enterprise to select
the basic organizational design they prefer from a menu of standard-
form contracts. It is possible (though difficult) to imagine a legal sys-
tem in which the various initial constituencies of a business venture
(equity claimants, fixed claimants, managers, entrepreneurs) create
new contracts that establish the core features of their business (lim-
ited liability, legal "personhood," indefinite life, freely transferable
shares) ex nihilo each time they form a new corporation. The virtue of
the standard-form arrangement characteristic of modem corporate
8 Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1757, 1764 (1989).
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law is that it is "convenient"; it reduces transaction costs by allowing
the participants in the corporate enterprise to take advantage of an
arrangement that suits the needs of investors and entrepreneurs in a
wide variety of situations.9
Corporate law should be enabling rather than mandatory be-
cause there are limits to the cookie-cutter approach reflected in the
standard-form rules that constitute state corporate law. Specifically,
different firms have different needs, and different firms conduct their
businesses in a very wide variety of contexts. If corporate law were not
enabling, the various claimants to the cash flows could not customize
the standard-form rules to meet their particular needs.
Significantly, this analysis implies that no particular set of con-
tractual outcomes is ideal for every firm. Perhaps the best way of illus-
trating this implication is with reference to the core characteristics of
the modern corporation. As noted above, at its most elemental level,
the standard-form contract for corporations consists of four features:
limited liability, legal personhood, indefinite life, and freely transfera-
ble shares. It is possible, however, and even common in certain con-
texts for firms to dispense with these key features to suit their
interests.
For example, with respect to limited liability, shareholders in
closely held firms commonly sign personal guarantees of indebtedness
to give their firms access to bank credit. Their willingness to guaran-
tee demonstrates that even the "core feature" of limited liability can
be waived by contract.
Similarly, the corporate feature of legal personhood simply
means that the corporation "has a name in which it may transact
[business] and be sued."10 Because the corporation's constituents can
negotiate separately with not only all of the parties with whom it trans-
acts business, but also those with whom it litigates, this term is also
infinitely malleable. Moreover, modem corporate statutes specifically
provide that the incorporators can alter this feature at will. The
power to sue and be sued, like other general corporate powers, is
modified by the Model Business Corporation Act's enabling language
"[u]nless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise,"" and
thereby openly invites incorporators to modify the corporate con-
tract's terms to meet their individualized needs.
The same analysis applies to the corporate feature of infinite life.
People who form a corporation not only may stipulate a finite exis-
tence for their firm,' 2 but also may dissolve the corporation after its
9 See id.
10 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1426.
11 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 3.02 (1998).
12 See id.
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formation, even if the original charter envisioned perpetual existence
for the company.'3
Finally, the core feature of free transferability of shares can be
contracted around as well. The Model Business Corporation Act
makes free transferability a default rule by stipulating that "[t] he arti-
cles of incorporation, bylaws, an agreement among shareholders, or
an agreement between shareholders and the corporation may impose
restrictions on the transfer or registration of transfer of shares of the
corporation.' 4 Thus, all of the core features that characterize the
corporation fit easily into the nexus-of-contracts paradigm because
one can easily vary or waive each by contract. Certain other corporate
law rules, however, are mandatory, and it is not obvious that one can
waive these rules by agreement. However, as Roberta Romano ob-
served in a penetrating analysis of ostensibly mandatory rules, "[t]he
rules that are identified as 'mandatory' in practice have very little in
common with the ordinary understanding of that term. They are
either easily-and legally-side stepped, or they pose nonbinding
constraints because there is no burning demand to deviate from
them."'5 Rules in this category include the provision for annual elec-
tion of directors, the prohibition on delegating to committees the de-
cision to approve a merger, the limitation on dividend payouts, the
demand requirement in derivative suits, the requirement that share-
holders vote on mergers, and the existence of shareholder appraisal
rights. As Romano showed, these rules are far more malleable than
has been suggested. 16
Moreover, the enabling elements of corporate law permit a firm
to structure a transaction in a certain way to avoid liability or
reincorporate in more permissive states to reach a desired outcome.
By reincorporating, firms opt out of one set of corporate laws and opt
into another. Likewise, firms can change their organizational form to
achieve a desired outcome or to avoid a legal provision they find un-
desirable. Firms can go private or public, change from mutual to
stock form, or become a limited liability company or a partnership if
they feel one of these organizational forms provides a better result for
the participants in the corporate venture.
Another striking example of the power of the nexus-of-contracts
paradigm is reflected in state law statutes that permit corporations to
limit or eliminate personal liability of directors for monetary damages
13 See id. §§ 14.02-.03.
14 Id. § 6.27(a).
15 Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Cor-
porate Laws, 89 CoLuM. L. REV. 1599, 1599 (1989); see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 544 (1990) (arguing "that,
appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial").
16 See Romano, supra note 15, at 1599-1602.
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arising from a breach of their fiduciary duty of care.17 As Robert
Clark pointed out, "[t]o this limited extent, a corporation will be al-
lowed to ask its shareholders to vote to 'opt out' of the otherwise ap-
plicable judge-made rules of fiduciary duty."' 8
Thus, the nexus-of-contracts approach provides a powerful analyt-
ical device for conceptualizing the modem corporation. Not surpris-
ingly, the "theory now dominates the thinking of most economists and
most economically oriented corporate law scholars who focus at all on
the theory of the corporation."19
It is also important to recognize, however, that the nexus-of-con-
tracts paradigm is purely descriptive. It is a positive, not a normative,
tool. To say that the firm is a nexus of contracts is only the beginning
of the analysis because this paradigm tells us nothing about the sub-
stance of these contracts. The theory provides no information about
either what provisions are (or should be) contained in the standard-
form contracts or what provisions are (or should be) waived and by
whom. As Jensen and Meckling observed in their seminal article on
the subject of capital structure, "the 'behavior' of the firm is like the
behavior of a market; i.e., the outcome of a complex equilibrium pro-
cess." 20 Stated another way, from a nexus-of-contracts perspective, be-
cause firms consist of a complex web of contractual relationships, firm
behavior depends critically on what those contracts provide. In turn,
the contract provisions themselves depend on the outcome of the bar-
gaining process that takes place between the contracting parties.
There are two possible ways to reconcile the nexus-of-contracts
paradigm with the rival paradigm positing that corporations owe fidu-
ciary duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone. The first pos-
sibility is the existence of a "comer solution." A comer solution is one
in which the solution to every problem is the same. Thus, one might
reconcile the nexus-of-contracts paradigm with the shareholder-pri-
macy paradigm because in every single situation, shareholders and the
other participants in the corporate enterprise mutually agree that the
interests of the nonshareholder constituencies should be
subordinated to the interests of the shareholders.
The second possibility is that the ideal of shareholder primacy is a
myth. Under this reconciliation, the nexus-of-contracts paradigm
reigns supreme because the idea of shareholder primacy, like the
other elements of corporate law described above, is merely a default
17 See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 2.02(b) (4) (1998).
18 Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1703, 1704 (1989).
19 Id. at 1705.
20 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
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rule that the parties can, and frequently do, vary to suit their particu-
larized needs. The following section considers each of these possibili-
ties in turn and concludes that no corner solution exists and that the
default rule of shareholder primacy can be varied by contractual ar-
rangement. In fact, under a wide variety of situations, shareholders
and nonshareholder constituencies mutually agree that shareholder
claims should be subordinated to the claims of nonshareholders.
Therefore, I conclude that even fiduciary duties are, at their core,
contractual in nature.
II
FiDuciARY DUTIms TO SHAREHOLDERS
Commentators extensively have discussed the question of why
shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary du-
ties.21 The economic justification for having fiduciary duties at all is
that "[f] iduciary duties are the mechanism invented by the legal sys-
tem for filling in the unspecified terms of shareholders' contingent
[contracts]."22 However, one cannotjump from the fact that fiduciary
duties serve a gap-filling function in the law to the conclusion that
shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of such duties.
One needs an additional step.
Easterbrook and Fischel maintain that one can justify making
shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties
because of the shareholders' unique status as residual claimants.2 3 Be-
cause- shareholders are residual claimants, they receive the benefits-
and incur the costs-associated with marginal, or discretionary, cor-
porate decisions.24 Thus, according to Easterbrook and Fischel, un-
like shareholders who are residual claimants, nonshareholder
constituencies, as fixed claimants, are indifferent to most corporate
decisions. Corporations still will be able to meet their contractual ob-
ligations to the other constituencies regardless of whether corporate
decisions turn out well or not. In other words, every decision a corpo-
ration makes affects shareholders' wealth, but far fewer decisions will
affect, for example, the ability of the firm to meet its payroll or its
obligations to bondholders.
Thus, the essence of the corner-solution argument is that fiduci-
ary duties flow to shareholders because shareholders are the corpo-
rate constituency that values those duties most highly. The problem
21 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 6, passim; Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, supra note 7, at 403; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A
Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 401 (1993).
22 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 407.
23 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 403.
24 See id.
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with this argument is that one can easily imagine situations in which
nonshareholder constituencies will be concerned as much as, if not
more than, shareholders about the outcomes associated with a partic-
ular corporate decision. Take, for example, a large publicly held com-
pany with many highly diversified, small-stakes shareholders. Suppose
further that this company has a workforce comprised of people with
undiversified, firm-specific skills. A firm-specific skill is ajob skill that
is specific to a particular job.2 5 Firm-specific skills, by definition, can-
not easily be transported from one job to another because these skills
are of value only to the firm with which they are associated. Under
this set of assumptions, one easily can imagine that workers who pos-
sess only firm-specific skills would be harmed far more than share-
holders by layoffs, plant closings, and other corporate decisions that
would cause the workers to forfeit the value of their investments in
firm-specific human capital. 26
Thus, while Easterbrook and Fischel are correct that for a wide
range of issues corporate decisions concern shareholders alone, this
observation will not be true with respect to all issues. For many issues,
workers and local communities, not to mention customers, suppliers,
and managers, will care much more deeply about the decision than
shareholders. Thus, the corner-solution argument, which posits that
fiduciary duties flow exclusively to shareholders because they value
them most highly and therefore will always contract for them, seems
clearly wrong.
III
CoNTRACTs VERSUS FmuciRY DuTEs
One should view the arguments made above about firm-specific
human capital investment from the perspective of the nexus-of-con-
tracts paradigm. Clearly, workers care deeply about issues such as job
security. A theory that argues that workers value job security and high
wages less than shareholders value competitive returns on their equity
investments is highly implausible. It stands to reason that workers
should be able to contract ex ante for job security and competitive
wages. Of course, the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders do not
prevent workers from bargaining for and obtaining an agreement
with respect to these and other employment issues.
The point here is that one can contract away fiduciary duties to
shareholders. Consequently, despite the appearance of intractability,
25 See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315 (1978).
26 For a more complete explanation of human capital investments and their relation
to fiduciary duties, see Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and
the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. 173, 188-97.
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fiduciary duties are simply another default rule that shareholders and
nonshareholder constituencies can customize as they please. Fiduci-
ary duties only operate in the shadow of the express contractual ar-
rangements that nonshareholder constituencies have with the firm.
For example, banks, bondholders, and other fixed claimants com-
monly negotiate contractual protections for themselves. These provi-
sions seriously impair the ability of shareholders to use the cash flows
generated by a firm in a manner in which the shareholders can bene-
fit at the expense of fixed claimants.27
Corporations in search of capital routinely agree to restrict their
ability to make investments, loans, or other extensions of credit as a
condition to receiving funds from lenders. Additionally, when share-
holders grant secured credit, they voluntarily agree to subordinate
their claims to specific assets to certain creditors. Similarly, firms rou-
tinely restrict their ability to make dividend payments to shareholders
to obtain access to bond markets.
Thus, as with contracts with workers, contracts between share-
holders and firms routinely subordinate the claims of shareholders to
those of nonshareholder constituencies. These contracts clearly im-
pede the freedom of directors and managers to maximize shareholder
wealth. One response to this argument is that these restrictions on
the ability of corporations to maximize shareholder value are consis-
tent with the shareholder-primacy paradigm because all of these con-
tracts benefit shareholders in the end. Shareholders are willing to
bargain with workers to give them job security and better wages be-
cause doing so allows them to attract and retain better workers, and
thereby increases profitability. Presumably, shareholders only would
approve wage packages and job security commitments to the extent
that the benefits of these agreements in the form of higher worker
productivity equal or exceed the costs in the form of higher operating
costs.
Similar logic applies to other fixed claimants such as bondholders
and lenders. For example, corporations often provide fixed claimants
with security interests in corporate assets or agree to restrictions on
dividend payments or investments. These agreements benefit share-
holders by increasing the availability of credit and lowering the cost of
borrowing. In other words, shareholders price the promises they make
to nonshareholder constituencies. Shareholders will make such
promises only to the extent that the benefits of making these promises
outweigh the costs. The same argument applies to fiduciary duties
themselves. Just as shareholders must weigh the costs and benefits of
making promises to nonshareholder constituencies, so too must non-
27 See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting An Analysis of
Bond Covenants, 7J. FiN. ECON. 117 (1979).
1999] 1275
HeinOnline -- 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1275 1998-1999
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
shareholder constituencies weigh the costs and benefits of fiduciary
duties.
A simple example illustrates this point. Imagine two firms, Xand
Y. The firms are identical in every way, except that firm Xgrants share-
holders the benefits of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, while
firm Y operates in a legal system in which it owes fiduciary duties to
the employees rather than to the shareholders. Both the workers and
the shareholders in firm Xwould be better off than the workers and
the shareholders in firm Y if the shareholders in firm X are willing to
pay the workers a sum that is greater than the value of these fiduciary
duties to the workers in order to obtain the benefits of these fiduciary
duties. Consistent with the nexus-of-contracts perspective, in which
the firm's bargains result from a complex equilibrium process, share-
holders will enjoy the benefits of fiduciary duties to the extent that
they value the benefits associated with these fiduciary duties more
than other corporate constituencies.
One can illustrate this point with reference to what Professor Cof-
fee accurately has described as "extraordinary departures" from typi-
cal patterns of corporate behavior.28 For example, in Union Trust Co.
of Maryland v. Carter,29 the court approved a charter provision that
deprived shareholders of voting rights for the first six years of the cor-
poration's life and prevented the shareholders from removing the di-
rectors named in the original articles of incorporation from office.30
One also can conceptualize these arguments in terms of the
shareholders' ability to contract away their fiduciary duties. Cases that
involve the fiduciary duty of care provide the simplest examples.
Shareholders can waive their fiduciary duty of care through ex ante
contracting. Take, for example, the classic case of Meinhard v.
Salmon.31 In that case, the court held that Salmon breached his fiduci-
ary duty to Meinhard by pursuing a business project (the development
of a valuable parcel of real estate in midtown Manhattan) without first
offering his business partner Salmon the opportunity to participate in
the venture.32 The case is controversial because, as the dissent points
out, Meinhard and Salmon were not all-purpose partners, but rather
joint venture partners in a real estate development covering some of
the same space.33 Furthermore, the subsequent venture did not begin
until after the joint venture between Meinhard and Salmon had termi-
28 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1630 (1989).
29 139 F. 717 (W.D. Va. 1905).
30 See id. at 725-26.
31 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
32 See id. at 547.
33 See id. at 550 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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nated.34 According to the dissent, Salmon's duties to Meinhard
should have ended when the joint venture ended.3 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo maintained that, at a
minimum, Salmon should have disclosed the new, opportunity to
Meinhard so that Meinhard could have had the opportunity to make
his own offer.36 The majority's approach seems justified on the
ground that the business opportunity in dispute had been extended
to Salmon in his capacity as a joint venturer.37 Moreover, the oppor-
tunity arose while Salmon had an ongoing fiduciary duty to Meinhard.
From the perspective of this paper, the interesting question in
Meinhard v. Salmon is whether the case would have turned out differ-
ently if the parties had a pre-existing agreement with respect to the
disclosure of new opportunities. Suppose, for example, that Mein-
hard and Salmon's joint venture contract specified that their business
relationship was to terminate at the end of the joint venture period
and that Salmon was under no obligation to extend future business
opportunities of any kind to Meinhard or even to inform Meinhard of
such opportunities. Under these hypothetical facts, the case would
have come out differently because the agreement would have defined
the contours of the duties that Salmon owed to Meinhard. In other
words, the fiduciary duty of loyalty that Salmon owed to his partner
Meinhard was not intractable. He could have altered it by contractual
agreement.
This is a startling claim. Commentators routinely assert that, re-
gardless of whatever one may say about the duty of care, the duty of
loyalty is nonwaivable.38 As Mel Eisenberg pointed out, virtually all
statutes that permit corporations to limit or eliminate personal liabil-
ity of directors for simple duty-of-care violations contain provisions
that explicitly exclude from their coverage duty-of-loyalty violations by
either directors or officers.3 9
However, the corporate opportunities doctrine
is the law's attempt to regulate circumstances in which a corporate
officer or director may usurp new business prospects for her own
account without first offering them to the firm. The doctrine-a
34 See id at 546.
35 See id. at 552 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
36 See id at 547.
37 See id at 546.
38 See AMERICAN LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoVERNANcE: ANALuSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 7.19 reporter's note 5 (1992).
39 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461,
1470 n.43 (1989).
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subspecies of the fiduciary duty of loyalty-has been a mainstay in
the corporations law of virtually every state for well over a century.40
Even law and economics scholars routinely characterize the corporate
opportunities doctrine as a mandatory rule rather than a default rule.
For example, Ian Ayres and Rob Gertner claim that firms can contract
to increase the scope of their fiduciary duties, but not to limit the
scope of such duties.4 1 It does seem, though, that parties can "craft[ I]
an express definition of a 'corporate opportunity"' by agreeing in ad-
vance to permit a director or other fiduciary to pursue a particular
activity.42 Moreover, even if the corporation and the fiduciary have
not agreed in advance (for example, at the time the corporation hires
the fiduciary) to permit the fiduciary to pursue a particular opportu-
nity, the fiduciary may still avail herself of that opportunity by disclos-
ing the opportunity to the firm and obtaining the firm's permission to
pursue the opportunity.43 If the fiduciary fails to obtain permission
prior to exploiting the opportunity, however, "any authorization, ap-
proval, or ratification by the firm is voidable, and an appropriation of
the project by the agent constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty."4' In
other words, the corporate opportunities doctrine, which is a compo-
nent of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, "is, fundamentally, little more
than a default mechanism for allocating property rights between a
corporation and those who manage it." 4 5
The same analysis holds true for rules related to another impor-
tant component of the duty of loyalty: the rules related to directors'
conflict-of-interest transactions. Historically, transactions between
corporations and their directors were automatically voidable at the
wish of the corporation.4 6 This legal rule proved incompatible with
the needs of many corporations, however, because countless situations
arose in which transactions between directors and the corporation
were in the best interests of the corporation. For example, cash-
strapped businesses sometimes turn to directors for loans. Directors
would be unwilling to make such loans if the corporation could void
the terms of the accompanying loan agreements after credit had been
extended.
40 Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate
Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE LJ. 277, 279 (1998).
41 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 743 (1992).
42 Talley, supra note 40, at 287 n.20 (citing American Inv. Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F.
Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. 1955), as an example of a court permitting parties to craft such
terms).
43 See id. at 288.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 280.
46 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LA-%v § 5.1 (1986).
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The current law solves the problem of director conflict-of-interest
transactions by establishing a default rule against these contracts, but
permitting such transactions to go forward if disinterested directors
(or shareholders) approve them after full disclosure of both the exis-
tence of the conflict of interest and the specifics of the transaction
being contemplated. 47 Thus, as with the corporate opportunities doc-
trine, the law regarding directors' conflict-of-interest transactions is
enabling and permissive rather than mandatory and inflexible.
Nevertheless, do all corporate law rules really fit so easily under
the nexus-of-contracts umbrella? Are there certain corporate actions,
such as stealing, that are clearly outside the realm of contract? The
answer to these questions lies in understanding what is meant by the
term "stealing." Stealing necessarily involves wrongful conduct. How-
ever, if one obtains the permission of the owner, there can be no
theft. Consequently, a corporation cannot "permit" a fiduciary to
steal things.
Somewhat more formally, the analytical confusion on this issue
stems from an inability to distinguish between ex ante and ex post
waivers of the duty of loyalty. The law does not permit ex post waivers
because such waivers would constitute a breach of contract or worse;
however, the law does permit ex ante waivers of fiduciary duties.
This analysis has interesting implications for the way that we view
the relationship between shareholders and nonshareholder constitu-
encies. Over a wide range of issues, of course, the interests of share-
holders do not conflict at all with other stakeholders. In those areas
where conflicts do arise, bargaining results. Nonshareholder constitu-
encies can bargain for and obtain virtually anything they want ex ante,
that is to say, at the time they enter their relationship with the com-
pany. Later, however, the nonshareholders are more or less at the
mercy of the shareholders because only the shareholders as residual
claimants can avail themselves of net earnings not already earmarked
for other groups.
In other words, and this is the point to which the Article has been
building, fiduciary duties are themselves a form of residual claim. Ex-
tending fiduciary duties to shareholders simply creates a legal environ-
ment in which nonshareholder constituencies are free to contract
with the company as they wish ex ante. However, after these non-
shareholder constituencies have secured whatever contractual protec-
tions for themselves that they can procure (e.g., bond covenants,
restrictions on dividend payments, wage concessions, or long-term em-
ployment agreements), the shareholders are entitled to the residual.
Critically, in this context, the residual does not mean residual cash
47 See MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 8.62 (1998).
1999] 1279
HeinOnline -- 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1279 1998-1999
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
flows. Instead, the concept of the residual claim captures the idea of
residual legal rights. Just as the standard default terms of corporate law
provide that shareholders are entitled to the firm's residual cash flows
after they have paid the fixed claimants, so too are shareholders enti-
tled to the residual legal rights that remain after the nonshareholder
constituencies have reached their own agreements with the
corporation.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to identify and then resolve
an apparent tension between two of the dominant intellectual para-
digms in corporate law. The first paradigm holds that fiduciary duties
are the exclusive domain of shareholders. The second paradigm
holds that the corporation is best conceptualized as a nexus of con-
tracts among the firm's various stakeholders. These paradigms seem
at odds; one cannot consistently claim that the corporation is defined
by the contractual relationships that exist among shareholders, em-
ployees, managers, suppliers, customers, creditors, and others, while
simultaneously arguing that these contractual provisions must always
subordinate the claims of nonshareholder constituencies to the claims
of the shareholders because shareholders are the exclusive benefi-
ciaries of nonwaivable fiduciary duties.
This Article advanced two competing ways to reconcile the ten-
sion between the nexus-of-contracts paradigm and the shareholder-
primacy paradigm. First, the Article considered the possibility that
the two paradigms are compatible because no situations exist in which
either shareholders or nonshareholder constituencies would find it in
their interests to agree that shareholders should subordinate their
claims to those of the nonshareholder constituencies. This explana-
tion proved implausible because there are many situations in which
nonshareholder constituencies might value a particular contractual
right or protection more than shareholders value it.
One can better reconcile the tension between the idea that fidu-
ciary duties are exclusive and nonwaivable and the idea that the cor-
poration is a nexus of contracts by noting that shareholders can, in
fact, waive fiduciary duties by ex ante agreement. In other words, the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are themselves no more than de-
fault mechanisms for allocating property rights between shareholders
and nonshareholder constituencies. Parties can make deals ex ante to
change the default terms described by fiduciary duties. Corporate law
establishes procedural rules to assure that the ex ante agreement
meets standard contractual prerequisites such as requiring relative
parity of bargaining power and forbidding fraud in the inducement.
Beyond that, parties are free to make deals that carve into the fiduci-
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ary rights of shareholders. Shareholders can modify the terms of fidu-
ciary duties both by crafting particularized definitions of fiduciary
duties and by expressly providing that officers and directors can en-
gage in certain actions, even if such actions clearly would breach the
fiduciary duties in the absence of such an agreement.
This Article has shown that the concept of fiduciary duties is
subordinate to the nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation
because, like other aspects of the relationship between shareholders
and nonshareholder constituencies, shareholders can tailor their
rights and duties by agreement. In fact, from a contractual perspec-
tive, rather than simply having their claims subordinated to those of
the shareholders, nonshareholder constituencies can contract with
the firm for protections that almost certainly will inconvenience share-
holders in the future. Long-term employment contracts and restric-
tions on dividend payments provide two examples of this
phenomenon.
This leads to the final point of the Article. Because shareholders
are residual claimants, the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are,
themselves, nothing other than a special form of residual claim.
Shareholders are entitled to the residual legal rights that other con-
stituencies have not reserved for themselves by contract ex ante, just
as they are entitled to the cash flows generated by the firm, unless
some other constituency has negotiated to obtain those cash flows ex
ante.
One core premise of law and economics (the nexus-of-contracts
approach) posits that all claimants to a corporation's earnings, goods,
and services are created equal. Another core premise of law and eco-
nomics posits that one particular class of claimants, the shareholders,
deserves special treatment. This Article has reconciled the tension be-
tween these two seemingly inconsistent claims. This resolution helps
advance our conception of the corporation as well as our understand-
ing of the contractual nature of fiduciary duties. The nexus-of-con-
tracts paradigm remains the core principle for organizing our
thoughts about the corporation. Although fiduciary duties are also
important, these fiduciary duties are fundamentally contractual in na-
ture because shareholders and nonshareholder constituencies can
customize them by agreement.
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